Contempt in Context: What Yaxley-Lennon Tells Us About the Limits of Leniency and proper procedure.

Two very different cases separated by five years, different factual matrices, and shifting public contexts together chart the outer bounds of judicial leniency in contempt of court proceedings. Leniency in committal remains the power of the Judiciary and not the Executive, and is not necessarily an appeal against the original judges determination. An issue that may well arise across the sea in the United Sates shortly. Baroness May of Maidenhead, remains the only British politician to have been held in contempt by the Court for her actions as Secretary of State, and then by Parliament for her actions as Prime Minister. She did not serve a punishment for either. 

In Solicitor General v Yaxley-Lennon [2025] EWCA Civ 476, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed on appeal the principles of sentencing for committal: persistent and deliberate contempt of court, especially where there’s no remorse or effort to purge, justifies the full force of committal. Why Mr Yaxley-Lennon appealed a decision that had followed previous case law was unclear. If anything the sentence appeared considering the case law to be lenient. 

That decision stands in marked contrast to the earlier case, where the Contemnor had unsuccessfully appealed the length of sentence to the Court of Appeal, but had concurrently sought to review the sentence in light of the then known circumstances. In Chelsea Football Club Ltd v Nichols [2020] EWHC 827 (QB), where the court took a notably more flexible approach—reducing a committal sentence in light of the COVID-19 outbreak and its impact on prison conditions.
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This blog post looks at what these two cases tell us about how, when, and why courts may depart from strict sentencing in civil contempt cases—and when they won’t.

The Yaxley-Lennon Case: Contempt Without Contrition

Mr Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, better known publicly as Tommy Robinson, was found in contempt of court in 2024 for ten breaches of an injunction that had been granted in the aftermath of a 2021 libel judgment. The breaches weren’t minor or accidental—they included releasing a widely viewed film and conducting media appearances that directly repeated the defamatory content he was banned from publishing.

Mr Justice Johnson imposed an 18-month custodial sentence, citing high culpability, repeat offending, and ongoing defiance. The case law really suggested even in light of a guilty plea that 24 months could have been imposed.  Yaxley-Lennon appealed—arguing that his prison conditions were unduly harsh, his mental health had deteriorated, and that a new diagnosis of ADHD should be taken into account.
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The Court of Appeal (Lady Carr CJ, Edis LJ, and Warby LJ) considered fresh evidence, including expert psychological reports and testimony from prison officials. But they held firm: none of the new information warranted a reduction in sentence. Conditions were as the judge had reasonably foreseen; the ADHD diagnosis, while new, did not materially affect sentencing; and crucially, the appellant had shown no inclination to comply with the injunction.

The appeal was never going to overcome the cold hard truth that Johnson J had considered the case and the effect on this specific individual, and that at the time of sentence, on the known information the sentence was unimpeachable, save that it might have been too short.  

A Softer Approach: Nichols and the COVID-19 Factor

In contrast Mr Nichols was sentenced to 12 weeks for repeated ticket touting in breach of a court order. When the matter came before Mr Justice Chamberlain for review, he was not the sentencing judge, during the early COVID lockdowns, he reduced the sentence to six weeks, so time served, from the original 21 weeks. Why? Because the pandemic had made prison "substantially more punitive" than under ordinary conditions, and for this individual with his specific health concerns it was a more onerous sentence that the judge at first instances, upheld on appeal, could have reasonable foreseen. 
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The court accepted that the reality of COVID-era incarceration—restrictions on movement, visits, and social contact—altered the balance of proportionality. The incarceration was significantly different to the conditions a civil prisoner was expected to serve under. Even though Nichols hadn’t shown deep contrition, he wasn’t continuing his contempt, and there was no need for coercive sanction. The reduction was justified.

Key Takeaways: When Context Counts—and When It Doesn’t

These two cases illustrate how sentencing for contempt reflects not only the nature of the breach but also broader public realities. Nichols shows the court’s willingness to tailor punishment to conditions that make incarceration harsher. But Yaxley-Lennon makes clear, at least on an appeal: such compassion has its limits.

Mitigation based on conditions is only persuasive when the contemnor engages constructively—by purging, showing remorse, or ceasing contempt. When defiance continues, as it did in Yaxley-Lennon, courts will prioritise the integrity of the injunction and the rule of law above any claims of hardship.
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In short: context matters—but conduct matters more. It remains to be seen whether Mr Yaxley-Lennon, will seek a review of his sentence, as he should have done in the first place.